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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

ROCHELLE RITCHIE WILSON,
Plaintiff- Res pendent,
-vs-

Case No:

15277

ROBERT GAINES WILSON,
Defendant-Appellant.

INTRODUCTION
Defendant-Appellant Robert G. Wilson (hereinafter Defendant) respect:c)
submits the following brief in reply to the brief of Plaintiff-Respondent RocheEe
R. Wilson (hereinafter Plaintiff) dated February 21, 1978.

Defendant vigorouo:

disputes many statements contained in the Statement of Facts in Plaintiff's
brief (pp. 3-14).

However, since the facts are so interrelated with the le;ai

points at issue, Defendant does not no·N undertake to correct Plaintiff's Statc~.d
of Facts.

Rather, the facts will be discus sed as appropriate under the follow1::!

argument headings.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.

THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION I:f\; l\PKI\G
ITS ALIMONY AWARD AND PROPERTY DISTRIBUTION·

In her brief, Plaintiff devotes an inordinate nu::1ber :Jf ;:ages at:ec.~:::·
to convince this Court that the Trial Court's action should not be r.Jodifiej ,.._,;

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

said action constituted "abuse of discretion".
abuse of discretion is the standard.

Defendant agrees with Plaintiff;

However, Defendant disagrees sharply

with Plaintiff's definition of exactly what constitutes an abuse of discretion.
Plaintiff has taken the most extreme cases to be found anywhere - none of which
are Utah decisions - upon which to base her definition of "abuse of discretion".
Abuse of discretion is not, as Plaintiff claims, an action "so palpably
and grossly violative of fact and logic that it evidences not exercise of will but
perversity of will; not exercise of judgment but defiance thereof; not exercise of
reason but rather passion and bias".

Nor, does abuse of discretion mean an

action which is "arbitrary, fanciful or clearly unreasonable"; nor does it exist
only when the record is "devoid of competent evidence in support of the Court's

decision".

(Plaintiff's Brief p. 19)

Were abuse of discretion defined in the

aforementioned terminology, there would be no purpose for the constitutionally
mandated requirement that this Court review both the law and the facts in divorce
actions.

(Article VIII, Sec. 9, Constitution of Utah)

On the contrary, as stated in Tsoufakis v. Tsoufakis, 14 Utah 2d 2 73, 382
?.2d 412 (1963), abuse of discretion is defined simply as an unjust and inequitable
anion.

This definition accords with the definitions given the term by a majority

of courts across the country.

The following quotations are representative:

"'Abuse of discretion' usually means doing differently
from what the reviewing authority would have felt called
upon to do, depending upon the facts of the particular
case." Williams v. State, 159 Tex. Cr. R. 443, 265 S.W.
2d92, 95.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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"'Abuse of discretion' by trial court does not necessarily
mean ulterior motive, arbitrary conduct or willful disregard
of litigant's rights, but may mean failure to apply principle
of law applicable to situation, if prejudice thereby results to
litigant." Statev. Virgi, 840hioApp. 15, 81N.E.2d295, 298;
State v. Shafer, 71 Ohio App. 1, 47 N.E.2d 669,670.
"Tenn 'abuse of discretion' is a strict legal tenn indicating
that appellate court is simply of opinion that there was
a commission of an error of law in the circumstances."
Tunstall v. Lerner Shops, 160 S.C. 557, 159 S.E. 386, 388.
"The tenn 'abuse of discretion' means nothing else than
that the court's ruling went far enough from the mark to
become reversible error. " Borough of Fanwood v. Rocco,
59 N.J. Super. 306, 157 A.2d 712,716.
The remainder of this brief will focus on the evidence which clearly
establishes that the Trial Court did in fact abuse its discretion in its propert';
and alimony awards.
POINT II.

IN HER ATTEMPTS TO CRITICIZE DEFENDANT'S DISCUSSJC:
OF THE TRIAL COURT'S PROPERTY DISTRIBUTION, P1AINTI?:
DISTORTS THE FACTS, IGNORES MA.I\JY RELEV.li.NT FACTORS
THIS COURT SHOULD CONSIDER IN DETERMINING W':n::c::
THE PROPERTY WAS DIVIDED EQUITABLY, AND TOTALU
MISEVALUATES THOSE FEW FACTORS SHE DOES CO(JS!I:E?,

In her brief, Plaintiff attempts to convince the Court that Defendar.t :::
numerous errors in his initial brief with respect to itemizing the property the
respective parties received.

It is true that Defendant counted the value c; :''

stoneware twice {$400. 00) and did not include the gold and silver coin collec>
($10,000.00) in his itemization of property.

However, in determir-.iCJc; whc'

property was awarded to the parties, Defendant took the list :Jf ;:;r-::;:er<~ :::~':
from the Divorce Decree prepared b:; Plai:-.tiff's counsel.

(?.. ~~. !~9-•
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It is now certainly inconsistent of Plaintiff to attack Defendant, saying that he
was inaccurate by making the aforementioned

omissions when such inaccuracies

were a direct result of Plaintiff's failure to properly prepare the Divorce Decree.
With respect to the Toyota Land Cruiser, Defendant admits that he inadvertently
did not include this in his itemization of property, thinking that the term "his
automobile" in the Divorce Decree referred to the Mercedes automobile.
It is interesting to note how ready Plaintiff is to pounce upon these

inaccuracies in Defendant's brief even though the s arne inaccuracies (upon
which Defendant relied and based his decision) are contained in the Divorce
Decree prepared by Plaintiff's own counsel.

Moreover, there is one additional

inaccuracy in Defendant's initial brief about which Plaintiff interestingly enough
has nothing to say.

In computing the value of the property awarded Plaintiff by

the Trial Court, Defendant made an error in addition.

(Defendant's Brief p. 9)

Instead of receiving property valued at $104,600.00, Plaintiff actually received
property with a value of $113,496.00.

If one includes the net value ($10,936.00)

of the money and property Plaintiff received prior to the entry of the divorce as
a portion of Plaintiff's property settlement, Plaintiff received property payments
with a total value of $124,432.00.
Defendant readily admits the foregoing inaccuracies in his brief.

However,

the Court should note that Plaintiff herself submitted a brief riddled with
inaccuracies and omissions concerning the value and distribution of property.
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Thus, Plaintiff's brief contains a slanted, highly distorted picture of the is sec
presently before this tribunal. These errors will be itemized and discussed
below:
1 . The most obvious inaccuracy in Plaintiff's brief is the total value
which Plaintiff places on the property she received.
this property to be $90,744.00.
incorrect.

She claims the value

(Plaintiff's Brief p. 10)

~f

This figure is sirr.•:·

Even if one accepts all of the values as specified on Page 10 Jf

Plaintiff's brief, the total value of the property comes to $108,944.00 and
not $90,744.00.
2.

In her itemization of property, Plaintiff made numerous valuatior.

errors in addition to adding the total value of the property she received so tile:
it appeared worth almost $20, 000.00 less than it actually was.

The condcr.i:.:

was worth at least $80, 000.00 and not $78, 000.00 as listed in Plaintiff's
brief.

(Red TR. p. 37)

Despite a jewelry appraisal by Diamond Brokerage''"::

valued her diamond ring at $6,000.00, Plaintiff still stubbornly stuck to a v2!.•
$4,200.00 which she claimed the ring to have.

(Plaintiff's Brief p. 10)

Plaintiff valued the fish trap talJles and bronze goblets, plates and flatware
which Defendant received as being worth $150.00 and $300.00 respective!;.
(Plaintiff's Brief p. 12)

These valuations fly in the face of Plaintiff's

estimates as contained in her own exhibits.
should at least be consistent.
she should do so for all items).

(P. Ex. 13 and 14)

J"Nr.

(Plaintif:

If she insists on using her values for

50 "' 2 -·'

\Vith respect t::J the suec:e ::::1airi, e'' 1
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book cases awarded Defendant, Plaintiff counted the ·.ralue of these items twice.
Said items were all a part of the corporate assets and yet Plaintiff figured their
value both as corporate assets and as individually awarded items.

In short,

with respect to the suede chairs, etagere and book cases, Plaintiff did precisely
what she condemned the Defendant for doing with the stoneware.
3.

Plaintiff maintains that one of the important factors in determining

how property should be distributed at the time of divorce is the money or property
each party brought into the marriage.

(Plaintiff's Brief pp. 3-5, 28, 34, 46).

It is true that this is an important fact which the Court should consider.

However,

Plaintiff's discussion of this factor is highly inaccurate and evidences a rudimentary
understanding of the laws of finance and economics. When the parties were
married, Dr. ·wilson brought assets of an income-producing nature into the
marriage.

At that time, contrary to Plaintiff's assertion, he had no concurrent

liabilities. The money which he owed his father was not a debt which had come
into fruition.

Neither was the $5,000.00 for the educational trust fund of his

sons by a prior marriage.

In short, these future debts in no way decreased the

value of the assets Defendant contributed to the marriage.

Defendant was still

able to contribute $15,000.00 to partially finance the purchase of the condominium
in which he and Mrs. Wilson resided and Plaintiff was still able to make use of
his :Jffice equipment and the business assets.

He had no current offsetting

liabilities.
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Moreover, Plaintiff's argument that Defendant entered the marriage
with an obligation to pay $500.00 per month in child support for the maintenanc;
of his two sons and that said obligation somehow operated to decrease the value[
of the assets Defendant brought into the marriage (Plaintiff's Brief p. 4) borders I
on the ridiculous. If this obligation is used to decrease the value of the assets[
then Defendant's medical degree, income, and potential earning capacity shoulc

I

be used to increase the value of the assets which he brought into the mamage.
4.

Plaintiff asserts repeatedly that Defendant was at fault in breaking

up the marriage and therefore he should be required to suffer monetarily
of this fault.

In this regard, Plaintiff makes many assertions which are

devoid of any substantiation by the record.

beca~se.
si:n~li'

For example, Plaintiff claims ttBt

Defendant fell in love with his best friend's wife and married her. There is net
one scintilla of evidence to substantiate said claim.

And yet, knowing full

well that such is the case, Plaintiff nevertheless repeatedly harps on such
assertion over and over again.

(Plaintiff's Brief pp. 2, 13, 14, 33, 44, 47)

If this Court is to consider statements which have no basis in the recora, ther.
the Cmrt should hear the full story and not the slanted and distorted accou~t
which Plaintiff has concocted.
5.

In addition to the above, Plaintiff also makes numero\!s other stat:·

ments which cannot be substantiated from the record.

For example, Plainti::

launches into an extended explanation of the obligations each party understc:
and assumed at the ti:ne of their marriage.

(Plaintiff's Brief, PP. :;-;;;
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1

However, no citation of authority from the record substantiates any of the
supposed understandings.

Also, in attempting to justify why she never sought

employment even though Defendant encouraged her to do so, Plaintiff states
that additional income would certainly have only added to his [Defendant] tax
burden.

(Plaintiff's Brief, p. 7) It is interesting that Plaintiff readily excuses

her failure to work and earn money for the support of the household on the basis
that additional income would have added to Defendant's tax burden and yet at
the same time flatly refuses to consider the tax ramifications bearing upon
Defendant's pension plan.
6.

Plaintiff repeatedly asserts that, unlike Defendant, she was awarded

no assets of an income-producing nature and therefore she was 3hortchanged.
(Plaintiff's Brief pp. 3, 4, 14, 21, 24) This argument borders on the ridiculous.
Out of the bounty awarded Plaintiff, Plaintiff need only sell some of the items
of property and immediately convert the cash proceeds into assets of an incomeproducing nature such as stocks, bonds, rental properties, etc. In short, if
Plaintiff has the desire, she certainly can obtain assets of an income-producing
nature.

Thus, it is readily apparent that Plaintiff's attempt to distinguish the

'Jtah cases of Dubois v. Dubois, 2 9 Utah 2d 75, 504 P. 2d 1380 (1973), and
'Nilson v. Wilson, 5 Utah 2d 79, 2 96 P. 2d 997 (1956) , on the ground that :he
'·lives in these cases were awarded assets of an income-producing nature whereas
she ·Nas not fails dismally.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology-8Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

7. One of the arguments which Plaintiff lists in an attempt to justify

her large property award is her contribution to the accumulation of the marita
estate. On Page 35 of her brief, Plaintiff states:
"The assets of this marital estate were accumulated
almost exclusively during the course of this marriage.
Its wealth was developed as a direct result of the joint
efforts of both parties.

Plaintiff, however, omits to provide any specification regarding her contribut

except to say that she performed the normal chores and duties of a housewife
In actuality, Plaintiff is merely trying to take advantage of a fortuitous set
of circumstances.

Plaintiff did not help support Defendant through the long

and arduous process of medical school, internship and residency.
she married Defendant, his career was beginning.
were all behind him.

At the tim

The frustrations and hare:

There seems to be little question but that Defendant w:

have enjoyed exactly the same financial rewards with or without his· !llarriag'
This is not to say that Plaintiff should not be entitled to any property at the
conclusion of her short-lived marriage to Defendant.

It is merely to say the.

her share of the marital estate should be somewhat proportional to the sacr;i
and effort she expended in accumulating said estate.
8.

In her listing of factors justifying the property award, Plaintiff:

not mention many of the other important ones, most noteably, \1) the time a
duration of the marriage, (2) and the children born and their respecti":e a·;s:
See McDonald v. ~,!ciJonald, 120 "Ctah 573, 236 P.:::d lOEc; :='rc<< ·.·.:~a'~'
Utah 2d 228, ..J.l9 P.:2d 199 (1966).

It

~.~s:

::e a;ai:1

e:-n;::~a.o!=J; ~- 2 • ~:~
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duration of this short-lived marriage was six years, seven months and that no
children were born to the union of Dr. and Mrs. Wilson.
As a result of the divorce and property distribution ordered by the Trial
Court, Plaintiff received property with a value of $113,496.00.

If the net value

($10, 936. 00) of the money and property Plaintiff received prior to the entry of
t!"le divorce is included in Plaintiff's share of the property distribution, Plaintiff
received property and payments valued at $124,432.00.
On the other hand, Dr. Wilson received property with a total value of
$193, 3 50. 6 5.

This figure includes the value of the Toyota automobile, the

value of the gold and silver coin collection, the value of his profit sharing
trust at a full $100,000.00 and the $9,399.00 included in the 1976 tax refund .
.~s discussed in Defend nt' s initial brief, pp. 1 7-18, the present value of the
pension trust fund is not $100,000.00 when tax considerations are taken into
account.

Rather, the current present value is no higher than $50,000.00.

Therefore, when $50,000.00 is subtracted from Defendant's total property
award as well as the $9 , 3 9 9. 00 which he received from his 19 7 6 tax refund
and which never should have been considered as part of the marital estate

I

.I

at all, (Defendant's Initial Brief, p. 9, # 36) Dr. Wilson's property award
totals $13 3 , 9 51. 6 5.
In short, Defendant was awarded property worth just slightly more than
:he pro~Certy awarded Plaintiff.

Plaintiff's allegation that Defendant received

~•:;e thar. t·.•:CJ-thir::is cf tr.e :-:1arital estate is erroneous.

In light of all of the
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factors discus sed in McDonald, Supra, as well as the factors mentioned in:
and Defendant's previous brief, there can be no question but that the Trial
abused its discretion by awarding Plaintiff such an exorbitant property

c.

awar~.

Said award should be reduced as suggested in Defendant's initial brief.
POINT III.

PLAINTIFF'S PERMANENT AWARD OF $900.00 PER
MONTH ALIMONY WAS EXCESSNE BOTH IN AMOUNT
AND DURATION AND SHOULD BE REDUCED TO
$650.00 PER MONTH FOR A PERIOD OF THREE YEARS
FROM THE DATE THE DIVORCE DECREE WAS ENTERED.

In her brief, Plaintiff makes many inconsistent and misleading
regarding the alimony issue.

state~.;

t~a: ·

For example, Plaintiff repeatedly suggests

$900.00 per month alimony award constitutes only eleven per cent of Defenji:
income.

(Plaintiff's Brief pp. 22, 2 3)

However, in making this statement,

Plaintiff does not mention that Defendant is obligated to pay $500.00 per mer
in support payment for two children of a [:revious marriage.

In short, it

is~.:

leading to infer as does Plaintiff that Defendant after making his alimony
payments is still left with eighty-nine per cent of his gross income.

Defe~.:'

has other obligations which are equally as pressing as the alimony payr.1e:.ts
These obligations eat up much more than eleven per cent of Defendant's gr:s,
income.
At Page 40 of her brief, Plair>.tiff states that no case could be foun::
which supports Defendant's contention that the needs of the soouse and the
duration of the marriage are two factors ::>f paramount im;ort::nce ·.vich ~2 502 ::
to the award of alimony.

Then, just a few li:1es later on ?a·:;e ~·J, ?lai 1 ~"::
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5

"In reality, the two factors of paramount importance
. . . are (1) the necessities of the wife, and (2) the
financial ability of the husband."
In one breath Plaintiff states that the needs of the spouse are not of paramount
importance and yet in the next breath Plaintiff states that in fact those needs
are of paramount importance.
Defendant agrees with Plaintiff; her needs are of vital importance in
determining the amount of alimony she should be awarded. In this regard,
Plaintiff itemized and placed a value upon her needs and the total sum amounted
to $5 98. 00 per month.

(Red TR. 68; D. Ex.

#" 2 9)

It is submitted that this

itemization made by Plaintiff herself is much more realistic than the selfserving $842.00 per month itemization of expenses she made at the time of
trial .

(P . Ex . 16)

In her initial $598.00 itemixation, Plaintiff listed the following
expenditures: entertainment $75.00, art supplies $50.00, art classes $20.00,
pottery supplies $20.00, pottery classes $18.00. Certainly, many of these
expenditures could be considered non-essential luxuries. ·with Defendant's
suggested alimony award of $650.00 per month, Plaintiff would have additional
r.10ney to spend upon her recreational and avocational interests.
Plaintiff obviously would still be able to maintain the life-style to ·.vhich
she has become accusto;ned were this Court to trim her alimony a·.vard to $650.00
;cer month.

This is especially true since shortly after Plaintiff filed for divorce

:Ceie:1dant gave he: over $6,0 00. 00 wit~ which she purchased a new, completely
~aij

for, auto:notile, and as a result of the divorce Decree, she was av;arded
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a thirteen room, fully paid for, condominium valued at $80,000.00.
P. Ex. 15, D. Ex. 21)

(Red TP.

Thus, Plaintiff- unlike the vast majority of Americar..

has no rental, mortgage or car payments which must be deducted from her r.:o·.:·
income.

She can spend all of the alimony payments she receives directly fer

her own personal needs and desires.
The permanency of the Trial Court's $900.00 per month award of alir.:·
not only makes it especially egregious but is also detrimental to both Plair,:::
and Defendant.

Such a high alimony award will definitely encourage Plaint!:'

not to do anything- remarrying, obtaining gainful employment, etc. - whlci:
would have the effect of reducing or eliminating her monthly alimony check.
It is clear that such a high alimony award simply encourages Plaintiff to s1t
back, do nothing, and wait for her monthly check to arrive.
In her brief, Plaintiff argues that the permanency aspect of her alimc
award can be modified if it ever becomes inequitable by the doctrine of ··c~d
circumstances".

Plaintiff misses the point; the award is highly inequitaole

now and 'Nas so the day it was granted.

Furthermore, it must be pointed oL:

that the doctrine of "changed circumstances" works both ways.

Plain :iff·::: ..

be much more highly motivated to find employment and/or rer.1arry if she ~~e·
that her monthly alimony checks would eventually oe cut off.

If at the ti::-.e ·

alimony award is scheduled to terminate Plaintiff has been absolu ~ely uncr,'
to secure suitable employment, then the doctrine of "changed circc:msta!:~ 2 '
could operate t~ continue t~e alimcny c·s2r: ~:J ?lci:---.ti::

•_::-.td s:-:e ~~-::s
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sufficient time to obtain proper employment.
Plaintiff is an intelligent and healthy woman, capable of obtaining a
meaningful and lucrative job.

In her brief, she makes it sound as if it would

be impossible for her to be retained as an x-ray technician or obtain any other
kind of meaningful employment.

In light of the large number of women

presently in the work force and the enlightened attitude of society in that regard,
it is preposterous to assume that Plaintiff would be unable to obtain an excellent
job.

At the time the divorce was granted, Plaintiff was 40 years old.

Most of

her working life still lay ahead of her.

She had no small children at home

who required her care and supervision.

In short, Plaintiff has no reason why

she should or could not be her own provider.
As indicated previously, Plaintiff contends that the financial ability of
the husband is of paramount importance in determining the amount and duration
of an alimony award.

Once again, this argument is misleading.

Plaintiff's

Jwn authorities as quoted in her brief establish that a husband's earning
capacity has no significance separate and apart from the wife's needs.

In

other words, the financial ability of the husband is not a separate and
;ndependent criterion, but rather is only relevant as it bears on the wife's
1eeds. If the wife is not in need, then the financial ability of the husband
is immaterial.

Exactly the same language quoted by Plaintiff in her brief,

?ages 40-41, proves the point.

In 24 Am. Jur.2d, Divorce, § 631, it is stated:
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"Broadly speaking, the principal factors are circumstances
which govern the a!TX)unt to be allowed as permanent alimony
are the necessities of the wife and the financial ability of
the husband to meet them." [Emphasis added]
And, as stated in the Utah decision of Hampton v. Hampton, 80 Utah 5 70, 47
P. 2d 419 (193 5) and quoted in Plaintiff's brief:
"The amount of alimony is measured by the wife's
needs and requirements, considering her station in
life, and upon the husband's ability to pay."
It is clear that the husband's ability to pay acts only as a modifier upon the
wife's needs and requirements.
CONCLUSION
By virtue of her divorce action, Plaintiff has been allowed to reap a
windfall based upon her brief marital sojourn with Defendant.

Many recent

cases strongly recognize that a wife does have the ability and duty to suppor:
herself, that her role in society is changing, and that the Courts must take
cognizance thereof.

Rayle v. Rayle, 202 S. E. 2d 2 86 (N.C. 19 7 4); Hirsch

v. Hirsch, 33 N.E.2d 371 (N.Y. 1975).
Although Defendant wants to adequately provide for the needs of the
Plaintiff for a transition period long enough so as to allow Plaintiff to obtain
meaningful employment, Defendant should not be required to sacrifice an
exorbitant amount of property to Plaintiff.

Neither should Defendant be

shackled with a $90 0 . 0 0 per month permanent alimony av.erd.

Sue h an unduJ,·

large award cannot help but have the effect of destroying any initiative w'cic·
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Plaintiff might otherwise have had to remarry or seek gainful employment.
Therefore, in light of the above discussion and Defendant's previous
brief, it is propcsed that Plaintiff be required to sell the condominium and
divide the proceeds with Defendant; and further that her alimony be reduced to
$650.00 for a three-year period from the date of the divorce Decree.

Defendant

therefore respectfully requests that this Court modify the Trial Court's Decree
and grant Defendant relief as prayed.
Dated this

__L!;f_ day of June,

1978.
Respectfully submitted,
STRONG & HANNI

Attorneys for Defendant-Appellant
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